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The Vision of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ as Model for Religiocultural Diplomacy 





Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Christodoulos (1998–2008) sought to co-shape the 
European Union. Seeing the EU both as a project and as a cultural-civilizational family of 
common integral, constituent elements of identity, he wished to affect the process of 
Europeanisation by enhancing the influence of its Eastern Orthodox flank. The emergent 
pattern of his aspiration resembled that of a unitary Eastern Orthodox bloc within the EU, 
functioning in concert so that to be able to exert influence and co-determine the direction of 
the Europeanisation process along the lines of its own values. That culminated in the 
archbishop’s exclamation that Russia should eventually join the EU: thus, a rhetorical 
reminiscent of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ would counterbalance the Westernist 
overarching model, to no avail though; after all, all Orthodox Churches pursue their own 
individual/national agendas at a European level. However, creed is a central element of 
identity perception and even though the Orthodox Church of Greece has significantly 
readjusted its policies, the deep-rooted religiocultural element of identity, evidently, was 
expected to have a sway during Christodoulos’ era, and that the Greek-Orthodox collective 
imaginary would conflate a sense of kinship to Orthodox Russia, with a vague, romanticised 

















Within the framework of Europeanisation as a convergence process and in line with the post-
Westphalian, postsecular arrangement thereof, the Orthodox Church of Greece (hereafter 
OCG) found itself in a flux political state of affairs that comprised new challenges and 
opportunities. The latter particularly appealed to Christodoulos, as through them he envisaged 
an OCG that would transcend the national boundaries that by definition restrict the scope of 
any given national church. He wished to internationalise as well as politicise the OCG and 
pursued this agenda via the route of the EU, so that to render the church an international 
religiocultural actor. Indeed, supranationality and polylateralism allowed room for non-state 
actors to observe the decision-making processes, voice their views and engage the EU 
Institutions; churches were no exception to this. In fact they were actively involved in 
attempts to co-shape the future of the EU, partake or at least influence the decision-making 
processes that corresponded to their priorities and by extension, in doing so they acquired 
much visibility, being thus recognisable as actors. 
What is more, during the era of Christodoulos even entrenched historical differences 
were briefly cast aside, for example between the Vatican and the OCG, so that to jointly 
pursue causes such as the explicit reference to Christianity in the preamble of the under-
construction EU Constitutional Treaty, as a common European religiocultural denominator. 
This does not mean to say that Christodoulos retreated from Eastern Orthodox theology or 
jeopardised corresponding convictions in any shape or form; he merely evaded the domestic 
critique for the sake of the end goal. At the same time though, his scepticism towards the EU 
emanated from the challenges that the respective project had brought about, with the place of 
both the Greek state and the OCG in that structure being a major concern, given that they 
represented a religiocultural minority. Particularly in the early 2000s when Greece was the 
only Eastern Orthodox EU Member State, the EU enlargement eastwards including the region 
of the western Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean – meaning essentially Bulgaria, 
Romania and the Republic of Cyprus – was deemed a sine qua non, so that to counterbalance 
the dominant, established western powers, challenge them and co-shape the EU. 
Christodoulos erroneously held the latter possible, provided that the largely Eastern Orthodox 
Member States would form an Eastern Orthodox bloc and act in unison. Moreover, for the 
above purpose he sought to introduce into the EU discourse the idea of a future Russian 




The purpose of the present paper, which stems from a larger research project that 
investigated the attitude of the OCG towards Europeanisation in the early 21st century 
comparatively, is to shed light on Christodoulos’ ‘Russian Expectation’ and his vision of an 
intra-European Orthodox bloc, which was rhetorically portrayed as a contemporary offshoot 
of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’. Thereby it explores aspects of the politicised mythical 
dimension of the latent Russian gravitational pull that was instrumentalised to stimulate the 
collective imaginary and psyche. The importance of Christodoulos’ role rests on his attempt 
to co-shape the fundamentals of the EU. He sought, in cooperation with the Vatican – which 
was unprecedented following the millennium of antipathy and animosity between Western 
and Eastern Christianity – to de jure establish a Christian European identity, while at the 
same time he challenged the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople by 
unilaterally stepping up as Orthodoxy’s leading figure in the Balkans. Moreover, he morally 
and politically enhanced Moscow’s visibility internationally, by advocating Russia’s EU 
accession as an antipode to the bloc-actor’s Western Christian domination.   
The methodological approach of this research was qualitative; namely, it was a 
content analysis, further broken down to thematic analysis. The primary sources consisted of 
archival material from the official monthly bulletin of the OCG Ekklēsia (Εκκλησία 
[Church]), Kathēmerinē (Καθημερινή [Daily]), a high-circulation daily Greek newspaper that 
is broadly esteemed, the official website of the OCG,1 and the official website of the 
Representation of the Church of Greece to the EU (RCGEU).2 Notably, all of the 
accumulated material comprises events and facts, not views and impressions, and the 
positionality and bias of the sources has not affected the analysis. The period of interest was, 
the Christodoulos era, i.e. 1998 to 2008, from his enthronement to his passing, given that his 
successor Hieronymos II changed the course of the OCG drastically as soon as he took office. 
The archival research was complemented by qualitative field research. Sixteen elite 
interviews were conducted with scholars, hierarchs and politicians, who were in some way 
involved with the state of affairs during the period of interest, took part in decision-making 
processes, engaged and shaped the public sphere, served in government, or were 
professionally and institutionally involved with Christodoulos. The analysis of the 
accumulated primary data yielded emergent themes, which, among others, offered insights 
into the attitude of the church and the prevailing international political tendencies therein. 
Among the emergent themes the Russian gravitational pull was prominent.   
 
1 http://www.ecclesia.gr/ 
2 During research the URL was http://www.regue.org/, now http://www.regue.eu/en/. 
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The permissive context of religious politics 
The international political paradigm shift that ensued since 1989 with the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain allowed room for fundamental institutional political reviews in light of the emergent 
vacuums. The momentum favoured the globalist current and thereby the significant 
advancement of the European project – embodied in the form of the European Union (EU). 
Particularly the Maastricht Treaty (7 February 1992) that gave rise to the EU, introduced an 
advanced manner of cooperation between Member States and paved the way for the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and the corresponding political union, hence it constitutes 
a momentous turning point. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty (13 December 2007) consolidated 
the EU institutions, their powers, roles and functions, and significantly contributed to the 
deepening of the Union,3 within the framework of the Europeanisation process and the 
multifold political and institutional convergence prerequisites thereof.4 
Supranationality and multilevel governance are constitutive aspects of the EU, with a 
bearing on its diplomatic practices and philosophy. The premise of pooled sovereignty entails 
shared and collective decision-making between Member States, while subnational actors are 
thereby empowered to operate at a supranational level, above and beyond their previous 
national constraints. By extension, such multifold additional capacities have allowed room 
for polylateralism, which is best understood as an institutional upgrade of non-state actors 
that are now in a position to systematically engage with actors/entities not necessarily 
equivalent to them. This, it follows, has altered the European diplomatic landscape.5  
 
3 See the Treaty on European Union (Brussels: ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 1992), and the ‘Treaty of Lisbon – 
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community’, 
Official Journal of the European Union, 306:1 (2007). For the full texts of all treaties as well as the 
EU acquis in its entirety, see also the Official Website of the European Union, ‘EU Law, EU 
Treaties’, Europa.eu, 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/law/treaties_en. 
4 European Integration is accomplished via convergence and the deepening of the EU with power 
transfer to EU institutions and corresponding decision-making precedence of the Council of Ministers, 
the Commission and the European Parliament. See Wolfgang Merkel and Sonja Grimm, The Limits of 
the EU: Enlargement, Deepening and Democracy, Estudio/Working Paper 76/2007, (Konstanzer 
Online-Publikations-System, 2007), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-185714, (p. 4). See 
also Radaelli’s definition on Europeanisation where the ‘ways of doing things’ impinges on political-
cultural identity: Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’, European Integration 
online Papers (EIoP), 2004, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf, as well as Thomas M. Wilson, 
‘Europeanisation, Identity and Policy in the Northern Ireland Borderlands’ in Warwick Armstrong 
and James Anderson (eds) Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: The Fortress Empire 
(London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 49–60, (p. 52), on ‘Europeanisation as the reconstruction of 
identities’. 
5 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, Studies in Diplomacy and International 
Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), pp. 151–152. 
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Past certainties – mostly based on the contribution of major classical thinkers and 
social scientists – that the Enlightenment and modernisation would gradually render religion 
redundant in the understanding of the world, are being heavily reassessed. Modernisation or 
secularisation theory is faced with religious resurgence.6 Because, among others, religion 
provides legitimacy and in that way it is an instrument of considerable capacity to sway 
audiences, mobilise, influence policy-making processes, even provide the international 
system with stability.7 Not to mention that religion is a central constituent element of 
identity.8 After all, the paradigmatic views of the classical sociological and political theorists 
have been for the most part Western-centric in the assessment of the world order and its 
future; the understanding of the international system through the deterministic prism of a 
unitary, homogeneous perception of modernity is no longer essentialised, while the patterns 
of sociocultural and political multiplicity across states are acknowledged, rather, as 
manifestations of multiple modernities.9 In fact it would not be amiss to maintain that the 
latter appears as the norm while religions, strong as ever, continue to ignore Western-centric 
and Weberian theses and their distinctions between ‘traditionalism’ and modern ‘Occidental 
Rationalism’.10 Moreover, the acknowledgement of Judeo-Christian values as constitutive 
elements of the Western identity is no longer taboo, when in practice the influence of 
religious communities in co-shaping the social and political Gestalt across otherwise 
secularised European societies cannot be denied. Rather, it is valid to describe modern 
societies as ‘post-secular’.11 
In this context, the post-secular state of affairs affects the EU; more to the point, in 
essence it has been a Christian Democratic project from the outset and supported by the 
Vatican, in the post-war era when ‘the free world’ and ‘Christian civilisation’ had become 
synonymous’.12 Religious institutions and organisations have been in contact with the 
European institutions, structures and bureaucracies already since 1957, presenting thus an 
array of communication typologies, which culminated in the institutionalised recognition of 
 
6 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religions into International Relations (New York: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), pp. 10–12. 
7 Ibid., p. 35. 
8 Ibid., p. 45. 
9 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus, 129:1 (2000), pp. 1–29, (p. 24). 
10 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 (2006), 
pp. 1–25, ( p. 2). 
11 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Notes on a Post-Secular Society’, New Perspectives Quarterly, 25:4 (2008), pp. 
16, 19, 20. 
12 José Casanova, ‘Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration’ in Timothy A. 
Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp.65–92, (p. 66). 
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this dialogue via the Lisbon Treaty, and in the lapse of time they contributed to the European 
Integration process.13 Moreover, churches’ offices of representation to the EU attest to the 
recognition of a religious-diplomatic dialogue in practice before this became part of the 
European acquis. At the same time, however, religion may function both in a unifying and a 
divisive manner, for, two opposite tendencies, the national and the supranational, are both at 
work.14 Indeed, the religious background of the EU constitutional order is traceable and 
thereby its public morality influence is identifiable as well, even though it shares the latter 
with cultural and humanist influences.15 The ratio and weight of these influences, however, 
together with the balance of power between denominations and the corresponding reach of 
cultural diplomatic attempts is not necessarily considered fair by all churches.  
Before dealing with the diplomatic engagement of Christodoulos it would be helpful 
to frame what Religiocultural Diplomacy and its constituent elements mean. Cummings 
defines cultural diplomacy as the ‘exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of 
culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding’,16 although, 
there is no absolute scholarly consensus on how it is practiced. Moreover, there are overlaps 
between cultural and public diplomacy, for instance, they constitute a departure from the 
practice of traditional diplomacy and both their target groups exceed the diplomatic corps. 
Yet, while cultural diplomacy is multidirectional and emphasises mutual recognition, public 
diplomacy tends to reach out unilaterally in promoting policies.17 Indeed, Tuch defines public 
diplomacy as ‘a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to 
bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well 
as its national goals and current policies’.18 Public diplomacy, a key component in the 
 
13 Lucian N. Leustean, ‘Representing Religion in the European Union. A Typology of 
Actors’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 12:3 (2011), pp. 295–315. Also, Lucian N. Leustean, ‘The 
Representation of Religion in the European Union’, European University Institute - Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS, 69, (2013), p.11. And, Sergei Mudrov, 
‘The Christian Churches as Special Participants in European Integration’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research. 7:3 (2011), pp. 363–379, (p. 376). 
14 François Foret, ‘National Religions: How to be both under God and under the European Union?’ in 
Luke M. Herrington, Alasdair McKay and Jeffrey Haynes (eds) Nations under God: The Geopolitics 
of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2015) pp. 196–202, (p. 200). 
15Ronan McCrea, ‘The Recognition of Religion within the Constitutional and Political Order of the 
European Union’, LSE ‘Europe in Question’, Discussion Paper Series, 10, 2009, p. 53. 
16 Milton C. Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey 
(Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), p.1. 
17 Patricia M. Goff, ‘Cultural Diplomacy’, in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 
419–435, (pp. 420–421). 
18 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York, NY: St 
Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 3. 
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exercise of soft power, is intended for foreign publics, interest groups, civil society, 
organisations and individuals, and, contrary to traditional diplomacy it is not reserved for 
clear-cut actors and roles. In fact, not only is it an essential diplomatic component, but it is 
expected to be increasingly so.19  
Soft power, i.e. ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through 
attraction rather than coercion or payment’,20 relies heavily on intangible, ideational 
resources, with culture being prominent among them. It is an ‘attractive power’ that exceeds 
the bounds of simple influence as it provides political legitimacy on the basis of justifiable 
moral authority. In turn, culture bestows meaning to any given society in a multitude of ways 
and at many levels, ranging from ‘high’ to ‘low’ culture,21 and in that sense it is a source of 
identity and purpose. Hence, religion is ushered into the discussion. The relevant literature 
acknowledges that a ‘sophisticated understanding of religion is nowadays essential in the 
exercise of diplomacy’; more to the point, the comprehension of religious culture as a central 
determinant in the shaping of a sense of meaning and identity at an individual and a collective 
level is indispensable.22  
Yannaras defines cultural diplomacy as the ‘systematic utilisation of elements (or 
identifiers of particularity) of the culture of a state in the exercise of its external, international 
relations’ administration’.23 Further, he explicitly takes religion into account and maintains 
that its effect is anthropologically tangible, in that it bestows existential meaning as it co-
determines the hierarchy of collective needs and aspirations within the context of community 
and further, polis and polity.24 Bearing in mind the overlaps between public and cultural 
diplomacy as well as the lack of clear distinctions in the relevant literature, at present, the 
term Religiocultural Diplomacy is opted for, in order to denote the exercise of cultural 
diplomacy, as defined by Cummings and Yannaras, with particular emphasis on the religious 
 
19 Jan Melissen, ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’ in Jan Melissen (ed.) 
The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005), pp. 3–27, (pp.4–6; 11). 
20 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 616 (2008), pp. 94–109, (p. 94). 
21 Ibid., pp. 94–95. Also, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 5–11. 
22 David Joseph Wellman, ‘Religion and Diplomacy’ in Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and 
Paul Sharp (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy (London: Sage, 2016), pp. 577–590, (pp. 577–
580). See also, Peter Mandaville & Sara Silvestri, ‘Integrating Religious Engagement into Diplomacy: 
Challenges and Opportunities’, Issues in Governance Studies, 67 (2015), pp. 1–13. 
23 Christos Yannaras, Πολιτιστική Διπλωματία: Προθεωρία Ελληνικού Σχεδιασμού [Cultural 
Diplomacy: Pretheory of a Greek Design] (Athens: Ikaros, 2001), pp. 13–14. 
24 Ibid., pp. 16; 24. 
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aspect of it. Moreover, public diplomacy does not quite fit the framing due to its 
unidirectional character, while, at the same time, Christodoulos was not targeting a foreign, 
but rather a domestic audience. His exchanges were by and large intended to forge links with 
traditional actors and institutions, whereas the Russian public sphere was not a priority. 
 
The Russian gravitational pull 
There is no doubt that Russia has a special appeal to the Greek people, which can often be 
politically instrumental in swaying part of the public opinion. In other words, Greece is 
sensitive to Russian soft power; often the folly of kinship disregards rationality, history, 
national interests and political realism. In this context the yearning for a ‘Byzantine 
Commonwealth’ replication can be attributed to both utilitarian motivations as well as to the 
collective imaginary and its workings on the sense of belonging. In contemporary Greece, 
Russia’s gravitational pull is attested by the Pew Research Center’s survey concerning the 
global opinion on Russia. Of all countries surveyed in 2013, only Greece and South Korea 
had a favourable view of Russia that exceeded 50%, while Greece had the best opinion of 
Russia in Europe with 63%.25 In another Pew survey of 2017, although church attendance in 
Greece was as low as 17%, association between religion and national identity was as high as 
76%, with 89% of Greek respondents considering their culture superior to others. In addition, 
despite Greece’s EU and NATO membership and political alignment, the role of Russia in 
the Middle East and Putin’s rapprochement with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
which ultimately opposes the Greek national interests in the region, 70% of Greeks still look 
to Russia to counter the West.26 This phenomenon, however, is variable. There is no evidence 
to suggest that Greeks are inherently pro-Russian per se, but there is historical and 
contemporary evidence to suggest that they do turn to Russia when relations with the West 
deteriorate, as was the case for example during the Greek debt-crisis of 2009. In fact the 
Russian gravitational pull is conditional and predicated on interest. It is mostly the mythical 
dimension of this relationship that renders it live and is of interest here. 
History, but also popular myths and prophecies are rife with examples of the folly of 
kinship to Russia on behalf of Greeks as they perpetuate such perceptions. Mostly extra-
 
25 Pew Research Center, ‘Global Opinion of Russia Mixed: Negative Views Widespread in Mideast 
and Europe’, Pew Research Center – Global Attitudes and Trends, 3 September 2013, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/03/global-opinion-of-russia-mixed/. 
26 Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe’, 





canonical prophecies, issued usually by pseudonymous authors who foresaw the toppling of 
the Ottomans constitute an example as such. The fall of Constantinople constitutes a turning 
point, of course, as it gave rise to increased and updated prophetic output. For instance The 
Prophecy of Patriarch Gennadios that dates back to the 15th century foretold the liberation of 
Constantinople and its return to its rightful owners with the decisive intervention of the ‘fair-
haired people’, elsewhere in literature called the ‘blonde race’; a broad interpretation may 
point to northerners in general but the dominant one is that he was referring to the homodox 
Rus.27 An impressive example would also be the Muscovite Prognosticon,28 by the German 
author Stanislaus Reinhard Acxtelmeier, printed in Augsburg in 1698, which was translated 
the following year in Greek by Konstantin Brankovan at the court of the Greek hegemony in 
Wallachia. Once again this piece stirs hope of intervention by the ‘fair-haired people’, 
namely the Petrine Russia; Constantinople would be reclaimed by the only free Orthodox 
great power and the Ottomans would be ousted from Europe.29 Yet another example, a now 
monumental piece of the mid-eighteenth century that made rapport in Greece back then, 
would be The Vision of Agathaggelos.30 It was allegedly written in 1279 by a monk whose 
name was Agathaggelos (Gr.: Αγαθάγγελος); an Italian version of it dates back to 1555, and it 
was finally translated to Greek in 1751 by Archimandrite Theokleitos Polyeidis. The booklet 
is actually attributed to him by researchers. The vague oracular prophecies predict the defeat 
of the heretic Catholics and the total annihilation of the Ottomans by Orthodoxy.31  
Of course the 18th century emergence of Petrine Russia as a major power, capable of 
challenging the declining Ottoman dominance, affected the Greek psyche and further 
encouraged the hope of intervention. Moreover, the establishment and flourishing of Greek 
migrant communities in the southern Russian eparchies, which in turn provided assistance to 
 
27 Marios Hatzopoulos, ‘Oracular Prophecy and the Politics of Toppling Ottoman Rule in South-East 
Europe’, The Historical Review / La Revue Historique, 8 (2011), pp. 95–116, (pp. 99–100). 
28 Originally, Stanislao Reinhardo Acxtelmeier, Das Muscowittische Prognosticon. Oder Der 
Glorwurdige Czaar Peter Alexowiz. Von Der gewachsenen Russischen Macht, von dem Tyrann Iwan 
Wasilowiz, bis unter hochsterwehnte Czaarische Majestat, Deren umstandige Kriegs-Anstalten ihr 
das Orientalische Reich und dero Patriarchen Sitz Constantinopel versprechen (Augspurg 1698). 
29 Dora E. Solti, ‘Η Πολυτυπία στα Δημώδη Πεζά Κείμενα των Πρώιμων Νεότερων Χρόνων – Η 
Περίπτωση του Προγνωστικού των Μοσκόβων’ [Polytypes in the Vernacular Texts of Early 
Modernity – The Case of  the Muskovite Prognosticon] in Zoltan Farkas, Laszlo Horvath and Tamas 
Meszaros (eds) Studia Hellenica: Εισηγήσεις στα Ελληνικά κατά το 5ο Συνέδριο με Τίτλο «Το 
Βυζάντιο και η Δύση», 23-27 Νοεμβρίου 2015 (Budapest: Eotvos Jozsef Collegium, 2016) pp. 59–68, 
pp. 60–61. 
30 See the printed early 20th century version, Ο Αγαθάγγελος: Ητοι Προφητείαι περί του Μέλλοντος των 
Εθνών [Agathaggelos: I.e. Prophecies about the Future of Nations], (Εν Αθήναις: Βιβλιοπωλείον 
Μιχαήλ Ι. Σαλιβέρου, 1914). 
31 Hatzopoulos, ‘Oracular Prophecy’, op. cit., pp. 100–01. 
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the homeland via the founding of schools, philanthropy, etc., encouraged the Russian 
expectation even more.32 After all, if there ever was hope of emancipation and restitution, it 
ought to be expected from Russia according to the chresmology that had become embedded 
in popular rhymes and Greek demotic songs, which secured the dissemination of such ideas 
faster and broader than the printing press, considering the widespread illiteracy of the time. 
The verses below, which I took the liberty to translate and adapt from Koinē (Κοινή) Greek 
are quite indicative: 
Yet another spring rayah, oh rayah,33 
this summer, poor Rumelia, 
till the Muscovy descends  rayah, oh rayah, 
to bring his army to Moreas and Rumelia.34 
 
Hence, even though the Enlightenment, and particularly the Neohellenic Enlightenment, 
opposed and challenged the messianist tradition that the oracular prophecies had cultivated 
for centuries, that does not necessarily mean that, what Kitromilides calls the ‘Russian 
expectation’,35 subsided. In fact it was strategically utilised by the Philikē Hetaireia (Φιλική 
Εταιρεία [Society of Friends])36 in order to encourage the Greek uprising in the 19th century. 
Its founders, Nikolaos Skoufas, Athanasios Tsakalōff and Emmanuēl Xanthos, consciously 
sought to make the most of the oracular prophetic tradition and its preference for the foretold 
‘fair-haired people’. Thereby they disseminated across the Greek society the rumour that 
Russia was a reliable ally who fully backed a potential uprising, thus making the most of 
what they otherwise saw as an ‘age-old superstition’ of Russian homodox intervention.37 
 
32 Stefanos I. Papadopoulos, ‘Ο Προσανατολισμός των Ελλήνων προς τη Ρωσία κατά τον Κριμαϊκό 
Πόλεμο (1853-1856)’ [The Orientation of Greeks towards Russia during the Crimean War (1853-
1856)], Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα, 3 (1989), p. 73. 
33 The tax-paying non-Muslim Ottoman underclass. 
34 Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 74. 
35 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
36 Philiki Etaireia was a secret revolutionary society, founded in Odessa in 1814 by the Greek colony 
that dated back to 1712. A similar group was established in Vienna by Rigas Ferraios which had 
bonds to the French Revolution and promoted the involvement of the Western European powers, 
while the Philiki Etaireia leaned towards Russia as Orthodoxy was considered a common 
denominator and a cultural link between peoples. See Andreas M. Wittig, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in 
Griechenland: Ihre Beziehung zum Staat gemäß der Theorie und der Entwicklung von 1821–1977 
(Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1987), p. 19. 
37 Marios Hatzopoulos, ‘From Resurrection to Insurrection: ‘Sacred’ Myths, Motifs, and Symbols in 
the Greek War of Independence’ in Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (eds) The Making of Modern 
Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896) (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 
pp. 81–94, (pp. 82–83). 
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Philikē Hetaireia saw its ranks quickly increase with the addition of primates, but also klefts 
and mariners, as Tsakalōff stirred emotions by boasting that he was acting as an emissary of 
the Tsar.38 Also, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century religion was still central in 
Russia’s popular appeal, particularly the misperceived symphony model where the church, 
the monarchy and the Orthodox nation would function in harmonious unison; and the Russian 
mission nourished this view, in the permissive context of the widespread Russophilia, as 
attested by the Russian diplomat Spyridon Destunis, who maintained that ‘the Greek people 
remain attached to Russia, which they have always regarded and always will regard as the 
only power that wants the well-being of their country’.39 
Meanwhile, it must even in passing be stated that the founding of the Patriarchate of 
Moscow in 1589 by the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II constitutes a turning point. Because 
it signifies the emergence of the concept of the ‘Third Rome’ and in that way expands the 
ecclesiastical structure and conceptual map of what the Orthodox world comprised. A new 
emperor’s name was now mentioned in the Eastern Orthodox liturgies. Patriarchs such as 
Meletios Pigas (1550–1601) and Cyrillos Loukaris (1572–1638) invested politically in the 
ties with the Tsar to the benefit of the church, while Loukaris mounted a very ambitious 
diplomatic campaign, in which Moscow occupied a central role as the sole free Orthodox 
monarchy. Moreover, an economic quasi-dependency eventually developed as the 
Patriarchates of Constantinople and Jerusalem enjoyed the support of the Tsar, while, in 
addition, the intensified trade and travel between Russia and Greece tended to be 
accompanied with promising tidings from the ‘Orthodox Muscovy’. In fact, it was during the 
rule of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich (1645–1676) who adopted the role of the leader of the 
Orthodox world, when the ‘Russian expectation’ was consolidated and took shape.40 Not to 
mention of course that at a symbolic level Moscow had already assumed the role of a ‘Third 
Rome’ since it adopted as emblem the golden double-headed eagle, following the fall of 
Constantinople in 1452,41 with self-evident effects on the Greek collective imaginary. 
It is also worth mentioning that the notion of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ as well 
as its memory survived in the post-Byzantine world after 1453 in the Balkans and Eastern 
Europe generally. During the late Middle Ages and in the early modern period, the 
 
38 Hatzopoulos, ‘Oracular Prophecy’, op. cit., pp.110–111. 
39 Lucien J, Frary, Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821–1844 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), (p. 241). 
40 Nikolas Pissis, ‘Τροπές της «Ρωσικής Προσδοκίας» στα Χρόνια του Μεγάλου Πέτρου’ [Shifts in 
the ‘Russian Expectation’ during the Era of Peter the Great], Μνήμων, 30 (2009), pp. 37–60, (pp. 38–
40). 
41 Wittig, op. cit., p. 135. 
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Mediterranean peoples constituted a ‘human and economic unit held together by transnational 
forces of commerce, demography, and culture’.42 More to the point, the Greek, Bulgarian, 
Serbian and Romanian identities were not pronounced but rather flux and adaptable. Up until 
the nineteenth-century ethnogeneses, nationalism and emancipation struggles, Orthodoxy was 
among the primary identity determinants.43 Moreover, apart from the post-Byzantine traces of 
social and cultural continuity – communities did not shift to societies overnight – the notion 
of a Byzance après Byzance can be identified in the multifold continuation of structures and 
institutions, albeit embedded into the Ottoman administration.44 It would then be legitimate to 
speak of a Byzantine afterlife, in the shape of a cultural, political and institutional influence 
that lingered on due to the profound effect on the Balkan peoples and their forms of 
spirituality, social organisation and material culture.45 
This does not suffice though as foundation for a new ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ or 
an equivalent structure, but it is indicative of a pattern: a constellation of symbols, vague 
narratives and prophecies, and the wish to be independent, albeit while realising that Greece 
has no strength to claim its full political autonomy in the international system, combined with 
an inherent anti-Westernism that appeared to shape-shift with the political tides while 
preserving its basic characteristics, reproduced a pro-Russian attitude above and beyond the 
framework of political realism. This outline is useful in that it offers a glance into the old 
elements of a mythical, latent ‘Russian expectation’ that offers itself for political 
instrumentalisation, by way of being reanimated to stimulate the collective psyche, which is 
what Christodoulos appears to have done. 
 
The term ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ as a convenience 
It should be stated from the outset that the term ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ is not used 
literally, but as a convenience, because it was explicitly stated via the official bulletin of the 
OCG that Russia should accede the EU, and by extension the Orthodox grouping would then 
 
42 Kitromilides, op. cit., p. 18. 
43 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural 
Encounters in Southeastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2007). 
44 Nicolae Iorga, Byzance après Byzance: Continuation de l’Histoire de la vie byzantine (Association 
internationale d'études du Sud-Est européen: Bucarest, 1971). 
45 Diana Mishkova, ‘The Afterlife of a Commonwealth: Narratives of Byzantium in the National 
Historiographies of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania’, in Roumen Daskalov and Alexander 
Vezenkov (eds.) Entangled Histories of the Balkans, Volume Three: Shared Pasts, Disputed Legacies 
(Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 118–273, (pp. 118–120). 
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comprise the peoples of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’.46 No conflation of paradigms is 
being attempted here; any parallels drawn are only indicative of a rhetoric that aimed to 
suggest a counter-paradigm within Europeanisation in order to empower the OCG. 
Archbishop Christodoulos maintained that the OCG and Orthodoxy were an EU outsider and 
an outnumbered denomination respectively, and he wished to actively promote the intra-
European formation of a mutatis mutandis coordinated, homogeneous bloc of predominantly 
Orthodox Member States, which would counterbalance the primarily Catholic and 
secondarily Protestant domination in the EU institutions, given the respective dominance and 
size of the Western European flank. To that end he thought it strategically crucial to advocate 
the accession of Orthodox candidate states; their joint populations, cultures, values and 
principles would be better promoted as they would occupy a significant number of seats at 
the table. After all, the post-cold-war consensus between heads of state was that of a 
‘common European home of liberal democracies extending from the Atlantic to the Urals’.47  
The term ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ was coined by Sir Dimitri Obolensky. It was 
meant to delineate and define the religiocultural, social, economic and political linkages 
between the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, through Eastern Europe, and up to the Gulf of 
Finland. Therein, an extensive movement of goods, peoples and ideas was regularly taking 
place. Furthermore, their ties were organic as they dwelled within the overarching Byzantine 
culture, irrespective of ethnie, and adhered to a commonwealth that was presided – variably – 
by the emperor of East Rome. The time-span of this state of affairs – which is best 
understood and explained within a Byzantine framework – is notably long, as it extended 
approximately from year 500 to 1453. The commonwealth reached its territorial peak in the 
11th century and consisted of the aforementioned regions, which were variably close to the 
Eastern Orthodox Church and the Byzantine Empire. At the same time peaked its cultural and 
political homogeneity, and while the latter gradually dissolved from the second half of the 
12th century and onward, the former survived and flourished anew in the late Middle Ages.48 
Of course not all different peoples and ethnies that comprised the extended Byzantine 
Empire subscribed to it and its values voluntarily, nor were they necessarily well-disposed 
 
46 Konstantinos Cholevas, ‘Η Διεύρυνση της Ευρώπης’ [The Enlargement of Europe], Ekklesia, (5), 
(2003), pp. 376–377. 
47 Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah, ‘Faith, Freedom, and Federation: the Role of Religious 
Ideas and Institutions in European Political Convergence’ in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. 
Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp. 34–64, (p. 34). 
48 Dimitri Obolensky, The ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’: Eastern Europe, 500–1453 (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 202–03. 
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towards it ab initio. Moreover, given that for the most part they had different values and 
traditions and they spoke different languages, one cannot help but focus on the cultural-
political instrumentality of religion. For instance, drawing from Emperor Leo VI and his 
work Taktika (Τακτικά [Tactics]), one identifies the strategic role of the Christianisation and 
Hellenisation missions of his father Vasilios I in order to control the Slavs within the Greek 
territory. Moreover, it would not be off the mark to maintain that the Cyrillo-Methodian 
mission and its aspired Christianisation of the Slavs was proven a very effective instrument in 
transfusing the Byzantine civilisation, thus creating a safe buffer of countries surrounding the 
Byzantine heartland.49 
Should one be tempted to contemplate whether the religious aspect of Byzantine 
diplomacy served a spiritual or a political purpose, i.e. whether Orthodox Christianisation 
was a means to an end or an end in its own right,50 the answer is that those two premises are 
not mutually exclusive. Indeed the church’s role was by definition supportive of the state’s 
expansionist political aims, and its apostolic work among neighbouring and remote peoples 
was encouraged and actively supported by leading church figures such as Patriarch Photios 
and Nikolaos Mystikos. More to the point, they were fully aware of the political aspects of 
evangelisation. The Christianisation of the Bulgars and the Kievan Rus for instance, 
facilitated the Byzantine spiritual, cultural and political penetration and influence, even in a 
radius that exceeded the domain of the empire.51 Even when Christianisation had no actual 
spiritual meaning, the political gains counterbalanced that by solidifying the Orthodox 
Christian Empire; after all, the Byzantines considered evangelism their duty. Religion was a 
source of power, by contemporary standards soft power one might add, as it had a sway over 
foreign rulers and peoples. Suffice it to mention that the patriarch was less likely to be 
refused than the emperor.52 To be sure, the dissemination of the Orthodox Christian faith was 
a religious and spiritual endeavour, in line with the church’s respective priorities, but at 
 
49 Vladimír Vavřínek, ‘Cyril and Methodius: Was there a Byzantine Missionary Program for the 
Slavs?’ in Cyril and Methodius: Byzantium and the world of the Slavs; Πρακτικά Διεθνούς 
Επιστημονικού Συνεδρίου «Κύριλλος και Μεθόδιος: Το Βυζάντιο και ο Κόσμος των Σλάβων» 
(Thessaloniki: Municipality of Thessaloniki Publications, 2015), pp. 18–29, (pp. 22, 25). See also 
George Dennis, The Taktika of Leo VI (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2010). 
50 Alexander Kazhdan, ‘The Notion of Byzantine Diplomacy’ in Jonathan Shepard and Simon 
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present it is the political dimension of the mission that is of interest. More to the point, the 
political and religious aspects were not deemed as mutually exclusive. 
The main pillars of the Byzantine Empire were Roman law and governance, Hellenic 
literature and philosophy, and the Christian faith with its Jewish roots. Those affected the 
Byzantine foreign policy and dictated its principles and purpose of the Empire itself, 
conflating essentially the ecumene – i.e. the Orthodox domain – with their perceived civilised 
world. The ecumene was better defined in the mid-tenth century as a commonwealth wherein 
each ethnie occupied a place analogous of its military power, political autonomy and cultural 
excellence, but no ethnic distinction was made since pagan had now become synonymous to 
barbarian, and what mattered was the adherence to the Orthodox Church. The Judeo-
Christian tradition had bestowed upon the Byzantines a metaphysical interpretation of the 
political, this-worldly aspect of the empire, as they eschatologically conflated its success and 
consolidation with divine providence while perceiving themselves as chosen people, and 
considered it a precursor of the universal dissemination of the gospel and by extension of the 
victory of the Orthodox faith.53 In fact it would not be amiss to maintain that the 
eschatological references can be traced back to the church fathers and constitute a 
characteristic of the social and political teaching of Eastern Orthodoxy.54 
It must be clarified though, that no Byzantine – or to be precise Eastern Roman –
systematic, coherent political theology, nor a macro-theory as such has existed. Different 
approaches and models have been applied, depending on the period, the context and the 
exigencies and particularities thereof.55 Yet, this does not mean that Eastern Orthodoxy is, or 
has been in its centuries-long history, devoid of sociopolitical content and involvement. The 
imperial ideology was permeated by Christian ethos, dogma and, ultimately, ideology, as the 
imperial office drew legitimacy and authority from the divine, while the empire was linked to 
the heavenly kingdom.56 Accordingly, Byzantine church-state relations were affected. The 
principle of ‘mutuality and reciprocity’, also known as the ‘symphony model’ or synallēlia 
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Culture (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 384. 
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[Συναλληλία]57 has oftentimes been referenced – mostly by clerics but also by scholars – as a 
potential source of inspiration for a future reregulation of the place of the church, erroneously 
and speculatively for the most part.58 Yet, not only this model was diametrically different to 
its modern interpretations, it was not even called a symphony model, judging by the 3,800 
etymological occurrences and variations of the term in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, 
where no such instance exists as descriptive of the relations between church and state.59 Cyril 
Hovorun describes this Byzantine paradigmatic model – we may call it symphony as a 
convenience – as a ‘single theopolitical entity’, where church and state were rather conflated, 
lumped together into one unitary theopolitical unit, and hence the affairs of the state and 
those of the official religion, taking after the Greco-Roman tradition, were being alternately 
interpreted via religious and political means. After all, citizenship inevitably entailed 
adherence to both institutions. Moreover, the this-worldly kingdom was divinely sanctioned 
and as such it constituted an extension of the Kingdom of God. In short, church and state 
were not separated, but rather, a distinction was made between their roles within the context 
of the single theopolitical entity.60  
This parenthesis was merely intended to demonstrate that the premodern model 
known as symphony is not implementable without being tailored and heavily adapted to the 
contemporary sociopolitical particularities and exigencies.61 In that sense, the church-state 
Byzantine model and the corresponding emergent patterns of political philosophy cannot be 
translated to applicable postmodern, post-national political theology, as defined by Carl 
Schmitt, who considered all notions and concepts of the modern state theory as secularised 
theological concepts.62 However, regardless of the lack of a political theology and an actually 
implementable, revised and adapted replication of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ archetype, 
there was a discernible pattern of rhetoric as such; of a post-national religious community of 
homodox63 peoples nested within a bloc-actor. This was insinuated, explicitly stated, but 
never actually pursued at an EU level; it was only brought about on the occasion of bilateral 
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exchanges between the OCG, the Russian administration and the ROC. In the greater scheme 
of things, Archbishop Christodoulos utilised the means and formal diplomatic instruments 
that the EU membership provided in order to pursue his agenda without actually 
endeavouring to form an ‘Orthodox front’.  
Apart from the office of Representation in Brussels, the RCGEU, in operation since 
1998 and inaugurated in 2003, which constitutes a diplomatic statement in its own right as it 
makes a presence by merely ‘flying the flag’,64 Christodoulos also set up in Athens a Special 
Synodical Committee for the Monitoring of European Affairs (SSCMEA) in 1998.65 The 
object of such institutionalised channels of communication and representation was of course 
cultural, intellectual, by extension political, and they constituted by definition vehicles of 
cultural diplomacy.66 Moreover, Christodoulos’ engagement comprised correspondence, 
homilies, visits, speeches, conferences, and he made sure to set up channels of 
communication with high-ranking and outstanding figures of the European political and 
religious milieus. For example his collaboration with the Vatican was intended to influence 
the preamble of the EU Constitutional Treaty so that a clear reference to the Christian 
heritage of Europe would be made – to no avail; also, his affiliation with the European 
People’s Party (EPP) constituted a strong statement of the politicisation of his engagement.67 
Essentially the OCG under Christodoulos sought to exert its soft power capacity which 
emanated from religion, a distinctive cultural element and an identifier of particularity that 
bestows meaning to a society, and legitimacy to the decision-making processes. 
Participation in the EU was never considered unconditional by the late archbishop, 
and the place of Eastern Orthodoxy therein was a central question within the broader context 
of the EU identity problématique. An early sign, as well as a representative example, would 
be the exchange between the SSCMEA and the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of 
the European Community (COMECE) in 2001. It was made clear by Metropolitan Prokopios 
of Philippoi (1974–) that Greece entered the union as a religiously homogeneous Member 
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State, being thus pervaded by this factor, but the OCG appeared prepared to make the 
necessary concessions for the sake of the common – among European churches – goal, i.e. 
the co-shaping of the EU. 68 The Roman Catholic Bishop, Joseph Homeyer,69 reciprocated 
and expressed the will to overcome the tensions of the past between Western and Eastern 
Christianity. It must be noted that he went as far as concede that there is an imbalance and a 
Western dominance in Europe while the corresponding set of ideas is being transfused to the 
Easter flank; to which he advocated that the opposite ought to transpire as well, i.e. an 
increased influence of the East on the West, so that to balance out the inequality. In fact he 
described his suggested course of action as Europeanisation of the EU, stressing that East and 
West constitute its lungs, and the EU needs both if it wishes to make progress.70 Clearly, this 
constitutes an acknowledgement of the obvious and it was in line with the Greek-Orthodox 
viewpoint. On the other hand, in this mutually conciliatory climate Christodoulos focused on 
the future of the European project and lobbied against laïcité and in favour of an explicit 
Christian Europeanness, which would unify all EU citizens culturally.71 This does not mean 
to say, however, that the aspiration to consolidate Eastern Orthodoxy was no longer on the 
agenda. 
The means to that end would be the, in early and mid 2000s, impending European 
Enlargement; thereby Eastern Orthodoxy would be upgraded to a potent actor, given that the 
increase in Member States, population, church representations etc., would have the analogous 
effect on the EU Institutions, such as the allocation of seats of the EU Parliament, while the 
geostrategic aspect would be proven crucial in the formation of the EU foreign policy. Not to 
mention the value-system and ideas that would infuse the bloc-actor and its societies. In sum 
the anticipated benefits would be multifold. Christodoulos considered the EU a precarious 
post-Westphalian domain where, in light of the pooled sovereignties, the balance of power 
would render Greece – and its church – obsolete; a cultural, ethnic and religious minority, 
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with little sway in the decision-making processes. Thus he considered an Orthodox front 
instrumental and the political role of the church legitimate.72 
First of all the accession of the Republic of Cyprus would reinforce both the Greek 
and the Orthodox element, and it would strategically benefit Cyprus. Moreover, he 
considered the latter a geocultural and geostrategic extension of Greece. In this context he 
believed that the churches of Greece and Cyprus ought to coordinate their strategies and act 
as one in the EU. To that end he sought the consensus of the Cypriot political establishment 
and the church. The latter in fact culminated, after Cyprus’ accession to the EU, in the 
signing of a document of bilateral cooperation on 5 May 2007 between Archbishop of Nova 
Justiniana and All Cyprus Chrysostomos II (2006–) and Archbishop Christodoulos, during 
the visit of the latter to Cyprus.73 
Christodoulos made sure to try and exert his influence in the Balkans too, particularly 
where the national and religiocultural interest dictated, with the agreement of the state. This is 
attested for example by the visit of Foreign Minister Georgios A. Papandreou (1999–2004) 
on 13 June 2002 to the archbishop, who had invited him. There they discussed among others 
the potential of a church initiative in the Balkans, of which the foreign minister approved.74 
But even before that Christodoulos had already visited the peace-keeping Greek armed forces 
of Kosovo on 20 January 2001, as well as the monastery of Gracanica and  the Bishop of 
Raska and Prizren Artemios. He also met with the Archbishop of Peć, Metropolitan of 
Belgrade and Karlovac, and Patriarch of Serbia Paul (1990–2009), and delivered to him on 
behalf of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (HSCG) a bank cheque of twenty million 
drachmas in support of the erection of a bishopric building in the region.75 Of course that was 
not an attempt to win over a future EU Member State, but rather to project power, prestige 
and the image of an Orthodox geocultural actor in the region. 
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During his visit to Romania though, between 4 and 12 June 2003, Christodoulos 
stressed that faith and culture constitute a solid common denominator between the two 
peoples and countries, i.e. Greece and Romania. Moreover he promised that the OCG, as a 
civil society actor, would assist the Greek government during its EU presidency and support 
Romania’s bid to enter the EU in 2007, and thus help consolidate the Eastern Orthodox flank 
therein.76 Following Cyprus’ accession on 1 May 2004, Ekklesia, the official monthly bulletin 
of the OCG, apart from congratulations, had an explicit reminder of the archbishop’s views in 
store. Namely, that with the subsequent phase of EU enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria 
would also become Member States, and in that way the Eastern Orthodox presence would 
emerge even stronger. What is more, the wish of the archbishop was noted that there ought to 
be a place in the EU for Russia as well. Thereby the heritage of Cyril and Methodius would 
be ushered into the union together with peoples that comprise the Orthodox civilisation and 
the Obolenskian ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’.77 In that way the aspiration was aired 
unequivocally. Yet again, on 1 July 2002, Christodoulos via his message – he was unable to 
attend – to the conference ‘Cristianesimo e Democrazia nel Futuro dell’Europa’ (i.e. 
Christianity and Democracy in the Future of Europe), indirectly repeated his wish to see 
Russia included in the European project. He was more reserved, given that his message was 
read out to a par excellence Western European and not a domestic audience; indicatively, the 
President of the European Commission Romano Prodi (1999–2004), and the President of the 
European Parliament Pat Cox (2002–2004) were present, among others. He brought up the 
geographical demarcation of Europe, which extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals, 
being thus inclusive of Russia.78 These are merely a few examples of his demonstrable 
aspiration. 
In practice the strengthening of the OCG’s ties with the Russian state and church was 
already evident since 2001 when Christodoulos visited the country. In particular, on May 7 of 
that year, when he visited the President of the Duma Gennady Seleznev, Christodoulos 
mentioned that the Greeks once looked to the Russian ‘Orthodox brothers’ in order to 
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overthrow the Ottomans. And with reference to the present and the future he maintained that 
Greece ought to actively promote the accession of all homodox Eastern European states, 
including Russia, to the EU, so that to keep the spread of globalisation and Western 
proselytism in check.79 The next day he met with the Russian President Vladimir Putin where 
he repeated his anti-Westernist views while praising the ‘symphony model’ of church-state 
relations.80  
On 6 December 2001 President Putin, followed by an array of Russian state officials, 
visited Archbishop Christodoulos in Greece;81 Moscow would capitalise on the opportunity 
to establish strong ties with an increasingly popular and political archbishop, who then 
appeared to be invincible, while at the same time Christodoulos promoted his agenda, 
according to which Russia could become a valuable non-Western ally. The international 
geopolitical substance of these exchanges is further attested by the visit of the Russian 
Defence Minister Sergei Borisovich Ivanov (2001–2007) to Christodoulos on 4 April 2002. 
The archbishop made the usual remarks on the historical and cultural ties between the states, 
peoples and churches, and praised the Russian political and religious institutions.82 But the 
noteworthy statement amidst formalities was that of Sergei Ivanov, according to which 
Russia and Greece share the same geostrategic conditions and face identical threats and 
challenges.83 
His cultural diplomatic campaign was short-lived. Christodoulos, with his geopolitical 
assertiveness, worsened his already poor relationship – over jurisdictional affairs – with the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople,84 as his policies entered the domain of the latter 
and undermined its international role while indirectly enhancing that of the Patriarchate of 
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Moscow. This friction, his initiatives and conduct were considered detrimental to the national 
interests by the conservative party of Nea Dēmokratia (Νέα Δημοκρατία [New Democracy]), 
elected in 2004, which sought to put an end to the antagonism and antitheses, while 
containing Christodoulos’ geopolitical assertiveness. After all, this had caused intra-synodical 
rifts too.85 Christodoulos had no other option than to grudgingly adapt to the political realities 
and exigencies, even though in his view the international political landscape, particularly the 
European, called for a ‘geopolitical pastoral consciousness’ beyond the national church 
constraints.86  
 
Emergent patterns and causes 
In retrospect, Christodoulos’ conduct reflected his wish to elevate the church to a key actor in 
the domestic public sphere; more to the point, such was his interventionism on all domestic 
and international political issues that even his intent to establish a church political party was 
assumed.87 The paradigm shift of the 1990s that reanimated the religious dimension of 
politics, which in turn brought analogous changes to the theorisation of Greece’s near abroad 
policies and the role of the church under Archbishop Serapheim (1974–1998), constituted 
fertile ground for Christodoulos who succeeded him.88  
It should be noted that Christodoulos was consistent in his view and rhetoric, already 
since his service as Metropolitan of Volos and Demetrias (1974–1998), and particularly so 
after 1991. He envisaged an interventionist public role for the OCG, which included the 
political domain as well. Ultimately, he wished the church and state to engage one another as 
equals and co-shape the agenda, particularly as regards crucial state affairs, domestic and 
foreign. Apart from adversaries, he also had a significant public following, and being aware 
of that he invested in a discourse where the church was portrayed as the nation’s most reliable 
institution and the ark of its identity.89 
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In this context, The 1990s paradigm shift was promising in that on the one hand, 
arbitrary and hardly founded scenarios began to circulate in the public sphere, which 
predicted the triumph of Orthodoxy in the 21st century, even by immensely accomplished 
figures such as Sir Steven Runciman (1903–2000), while on the other hand a perceived new 
enemy, the ‘New World Order’, was emerging.90 In addition, the international state of affairs 
after the fall of communism (1989–1991) led to the revitalisation of the ideologeme of the 
Orthodox bond between the peoples of Eastern and South-eastern Europe. The Yugoslav 
Wars for instance (1991–1999), with the strengthened Anti-western sentiment that was 
raised, reintroduced a collective sense of common Eastern Orthodox tradition in Greece. In 
the context of the time, the founding of an Inter-Orthodox Parliamentary Assembly by the 
Greek Parliament in 1994, intended to strengthen the political ties amongst the East European 
Orthodox peoples, was no coincidence.91  
Such combinations fuel the typology of reflexes that surface when crises, radical 
shifts, and major adjustments to the international status quo transpire; and an old mix of 
political ideology and eschatology – essentially a fantasy – re-emerged. In fact in the mid-
1990s, religious organisations and a few high-ranking clerics went as far as to speak of an 
‘Orthodox front’ that would face the Islamic and the Western one.92 Agourides attributes this 
phenomenon to two main causes: a sense of inferiority when compared to Western Europe 
and an ‘enemy syndrome’ where the enemy is by and large imaginary.93 Greeks, who, due to 
the strategic location of the country have collectively experienced an array of threats and 
enemies in the longe durée, are that sensitive to this syndrome that at times it surfaces as a 
national neurosis; whereby the reality of a threat becomes irrelevant and the enemy syndrome 
a refuge from dealing with the actual national traumas.94 In the case in focus such symptoms 
are detectable, no less due to the poorly fathomed, imported modernity, which allows room 
for the church to intervene hegemonically, identify itself with the people and in turn the latter 
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with Orthodoxy, while presenting itself as the people’s natural representative.95 In short, the 
poor relationship of Orthodoxy with the Enlightenment and modernity manifests itself as 
anti-Western populism. 
Anti-Westernism is an obvious cause behind the yearning for Eastern Orthodox allies, 
particularly given the implicit trauma of loss and the inferiority complex that Greek-
Orthodoxy has yet to deal with as earlier stated. One can safely attribute anti-Westernism to a 
number of reasons. To historic instances of divergence, opposition, even animosity that have 
assumed a timeless, everlasting effect: such as the ‘Great Schism’ of 1054 between the 
Western and the Eastern Roman Empire, or the first sacking of Constantinople in 1204 by the 
Crusaders, for which, indicatively, Pope John Paul II apologised during his visit to Athens in 
2001.96 Anti-Westernism of course is multifold as it also draws from localised political and 
cultural circumstances, yet in its contemporary form it is also coterminous with anti-
Americanism, anti-globalism, anti-capitalism, – Yannaras goes as far as to call it in 
civilisational terms ‘the Barbarian West’ – in other words it encapsulates antitheses to 
Western-oriented values and systems, with which literature is rife.97 
The European Integration, i.e. the Europeanisation process, has reanimated anti-
Westernism through Euroscepticism. Processes as such were never popular in Greece, neither 
among the people nor among elites who were critical of modernisation. This gave rise to 
sociopolitical rifts, with modernisers and Europeanists in their midst, based often on 
ideological grounds, and notably, regardless of party membership; Europeanisation was 
viewed as a threat to the country’s cultural identity,98 essentially to its particularity. The 
church’s positions on the EU are for the most part ambivalent and antinomical, thereby 
difficult to apply in ‘real world’ circumstances. Even though particular European principles 
may be criticised and rejected, they may be accepted on a different occasion when political 
realism prevails, which is indicative of the EU being viewed as a necessary evil.99 To be fair, 
the EU as actor has been identified with the Catholic Church, which has been positively 
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predisposed to the integration processes, already since the very beginning of the post-WWII 
European unification initiatives; whereas the first Orthodox country to accede the European 
Economic Communities (EEC) was Greece in 1981. This too had a bearing on its relevance, 
place, role and influence potential, and in sum Orthodoxy’s engagement with the EU 
institutions and structures is much more recent.  
In this context an emergent pattern demonstrates the unitary position that the 
Orthodox Churches hold towards integration: they prioritise the national interest and support 
the EU on the condition that the latter preserves its Christian particularity.100 It is notable that 
members of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) have been quite critical of the EU, as they 
see it as the root-cause of pressure on Member States to move forward with the church-state 
separation. More to the point, Bishop Hilarion Alfeyev, who heads the Representation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church to the European Union (RROCEU), accused the EU of ‘imposing 
militant secularism on Europe’s believers’.101 Also, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox 
Church Kirill (2009–), back when he was the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, 
expressed his Euroscepticism as well as his concern that the Western European Integration 
will go beyond the normative, structural and institutional framework and disseminate a pan-
European cultural paradigm.102 It would also not be amiss to maintain that, among others, the 
divergence between the ROC and the EU stems from their opposing views on moral and 
ethical issues, which pertain to the antithetical or conflicting standpoints on human dignity, 
freedom and rights for example.103 This is fundamental in appreciating that euroscepticism 
should not be reduced to politics as it touches on incompatible values as well.    
Be that as it may, already since the fifteenth century, ‘Third-Romism’, which boils 
down to Moscow being the successor to Constantinople, New Rome, as the head of Eastern 
Orthodoxy universally, is another parameter of an issue that extends to the relationship 
between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.104 
To be sure, the concept of ‘Third-Romism’ is not officially endorsed by the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC), nor was it germinated by it. It is rather a politico-religious ideology 
of which the Byzantine heritage, among others, has been formative for the Muscovite 
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Weltanschauung.105 However, this concept does impinge on the contemporary geopolitical 
thinking, in various shapes on forms, and by and large constitutes a ‘Russian Orthodox 
geopolitical metaphor’.106 
With regard to the churches in focus, a pivotal point, however, would be the February 
1996 action of Patriarch Aleksi II of Moscow (1990–2008) to omit the name of the 
Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople from the diptychs. This constituted the formal 
culmination of the friction between the two ecclesiastical institutions, and indeed, a challenge 
to the Constantinopolitan primacy.107 This was no accident, but rather, a response of the ROC 
to the post-Soviet jurisdictional challenge of having formerly secure canonical territories 
outside the Russian borders. Moreover, the ROC distinguishes three geographical areas by 
way of jurisdiction and vital, strategic interest: its canonical territory within Russia, which is 
free of dispute; its canonical territory outside Russia, where the emphasis is placed on 
retaining its jurisdiction; and the areas outside the Russian borders and the ROC’s canonical 
jurisdiction, where the Russian Diaspora is located. In the latter two cases particularly, the 
Muscovite Patriarchate seeks universal primacy and clashes with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. To be sure, the welfare of Orthodox Christianity and the church constitutes a 
priority for the ROC, yet at the same time and while being co-opted by the state, as Daniel 
Payne argues, the ROC and the Russian Foreign Ministry collaborate in order to expand 
Russian influence abroad,108 hence seeks to forge alliances, among others, with 
autocephalous churches in Western Europe, the Far East, and not least, the Balkans.109 
Breakaway churches, such as the Estonian or the Ukrainian, in siding with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and giving thus rise to parallel canonical jurisdictions, loyalties and ultimately 
political alignments, challenge the ROC’s territorial, canonical claims and exemplify the 
clash thereof.110 Clearly, the Ecumenical Patriarchate sees Third-Romism as an affront. Yet, 
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on the other hand, both the Russian government and the ROC see the recognition of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) as autocephalous in the same way. As a result, the 
relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Moscow deteriorated. 
Furthermore, this act was not deemed as agreeable by all members of the Greek-Orthodox 
hierarchy. Indicatively, ten Greek metropolitans differentiated their positions in relation to 
the recognition of the UOC by the OCG.111  
Be that as it may, Christodoulos, too, challenged the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, with the ecclesiastical jurisdictional dispute between the OCG and 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate over the New Lands, i.e. areas, albeit within the Greek territorial 
boundaries, under the ecclesiastical control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In order to fill 
episcopal vacancies in the New Lands, the Archbishop of Constantinople–New Rome and 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (1991–), invoked the Patriarchal Act of 1928 to validate 
the appointments suggested by the OCG, applicable within the Patriarchal jurisdiction over 
thirty-six sees of the New Lands, which are subject to the OCG’s trusteeship.112 Ever since 
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the OCG came to an 
agreement, codified under the 1928 Patriarchal and Synodical Act, with the key provision 
that the New Lands were entrusted to the temporary stewardship of the OCG. In fact, this was 
later incorporated in the Greek legislation. Yet Christodoulos, giving rise to the 2003–4 crisis, 
maintained that for the appointments thereof, the OCG did not need validation. The matter 
was eventually settled via governmental intervention, namely, by the mediation of the 
Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs in 2004.113 This was not a mere legality dispute. 
It is traced back to the frictions that emerged out of the churches’ responses to globality and 
territoriality. On the one had the OCG assumed a defensive stance to the Europeanisation 
process, which was perceived as a threat to the modern synthesis model of the ‘national 
church’; on the other, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was oriented to a transnational role, 
seeking to function as the global mother church of all Orthodox peoples, and ultimately their 
institutional representative. The OCG, in seeking to be the exclusive representative of the 
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Orthodox Greeks in the EU, internationalised its profile and organisational structure and 
challenged this narrative by having an autonomous EU representation and agenda.114 By 
extension this strengthened the Russian ‘Third-Romist’ case.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The structure, values and principles of the EU are permissive of the participation of churches, 
religious and philosophical organisations. This renders them both de jure and de facto 
partakers and observers in the polylateral fermentations of the bloc-actor. Indeed religious 
institutions have been integrated within the European structure for quite some time, even as 
contributors in the European Integration process. Moreover, the post-Westphalian paradigm 
shift of the international system has allowed more room for the exercise of religiocultural 
diplomacy. In that sense it is no surprise that an ambitious archbishop such as Christodoulos 
identified the vacuums and opportunities thereof. From within that structure he sought to co-
shape the EU in cooperation with his Catholic counterparts, while at the same time he 
maintained that he aspired to counterbalance the Catholic, and generally Western domination 
and its influence on the EU institutions, by the formation of an ‘Orthodox front’. Collectively 
all the Orthodox Member States could not suffice to accomplish that, however his long term 
and ambitious aspiration was to at least prepare the ground for a future Russian accession; at 
any rate he wished to set this discourse in motion, whereby the idea might mature via further 
dialogue and engagement in the lapse of time, but to no avail.  
Parallel to that, Christodoulos developed closer ties between Russia and the OCG. 
The political content of this relationship was more than obvious and it was gaining impetus. 
But this was neither in line with the political direction of the Greek government, nor with the 
national interest – not to mention that of the EU. Disregarding the political circumstances, he 
sought to reanimate – at an ideational level – the ‘Russian Expectation’ time and again, and 
the fantasy of a post-modern ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’, assuming that this would find 
resonance in the collective imaginary. However, although religion is a par excellence vehicle 
for the exercise of cultural diplomacy, it does not follow that the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ 
serves as a model for imitation in practice, against what political reality imposes – not to 
mention the impossibility of a contemporary ‘symphony’ in this context. 
 In fact Christodoulos’ strategy did not benefit the OCG in any tangible way – it did 
hurt relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate by challenging it – neither in the short nor 
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long-term. At the same time, the religious-diplomatic engagement with Russia was in itself 
short-lived. The EU Institutions did not adopt the suggestions of the mobilised churches, and 
no Orthodox front was ever formed, as the Orthodox Churches kept on pursuing their 
national agendas instead of converging them; the Committee of Representatives of the 
Orthodox Churches to the European Union (CROCEU) for instance, constitutes a structure 
where Eastern Orthodox cooperation is facilitated, but the limitations posed by different 
priorities and interests among national churches are indicative of the complexity of 
establishing consensus above and beyond any given national agendas and state-based 
approaches, in line with state policies.115 What is more, any latent Russian gravitational pull 
did not appear to be substantial, and the same applies to the afterlife of the ‘Byzantine 
Commonwealth’, even though traces as such may sporadically survive. By relying on an 
exaggerated past linkage, no new narrative was generated, one with valid projections to the 
future and a concrete agenda and goals; on the contrary, the age-old stereotypical narrative 
was essentialised as the cornerstone of this relationship. And when all is said and done, this 
was rather a rhetorical vehicle in line with Christodoulos’ ‘geopolitical pastoral 
consciousness’, towards the internationalisation of the OCG, so that it would be elevated as 
an EU actor, equal to the Ecumenical and the Muscovite Patriarchate. 
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